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The cases of Equatorial Guinea, Dominica, 
Haiti, Suriname and the Maldives illustrate 
another point. Small size, isolation or a com-
bination of the two do not necessarily signal 
either impotence or total disinterest on the part 
of other states. Spain helped to thwart the 
effort against Equatorial Guinea, the United 
States prevented the operations against 
Dominica, Haiti and Suriname, and India 
responded immediately to the call for help 
from the Maldives (with the United States in 
the wings). Indeed, given the Marxist orienta-
tion of the Bourtese government in Suriname, 
the worldview of the Reagan Administration, 
and an ongoing insurrection, according to 
the Thomas-Mockler perspective. one should 
have expected the United States government 
to exercise a benign blindness rather than 
actively acting to quash the operation. 
Still, the Maldives incident does furnish 
some confirmation of Mockler's prophecy 
about a possible change in the base of recruit-
ment. Postcolonial conflicts have involved con-
siderable numbers of combatants. The appro-
priate questions here concern s~rplus and 
skills. 
A close examination of the past 10 years will 
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reveal that few, if any, Third World conflicts 
have generated an abundance of trained 
soldiers free to peddle their talents as they 
choose. The dynamics of attrition, residual fear 
and ideology associated with the inter-state 
conflicts have assured that few soldiers have 
had the option or inclination to free-lance. This 
conclusion applies with particular force to 
soldiers with specialized skills. The same holds 
true with respect to other contemporary 
guerrilla-insurgent hostilities. 
The intriguing new possibility, however, 
stems from the speculation that this raid signals 
a permutation that no one has foreseen-
rebels willing to sell their services as experi-
enced soldiers on the open markefas a means 
to finance their operations. In a world awash 
with instability, this may signal yet another 
dimension to "low-intensity conflict." 
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• In the March 1988 issue of Defense Analysis E. 
Schneider presented a comprehensive discus-
sion concerning the causal factors in affecting 
United States defense expenditures during the 
postwar era. 1 Schneider hypothesized that the 
main factors requiring attention were: (1) 
international events (2) changing administra-
tions, (3) public opinion, (4) elite perceptions, 
(5) congressional attitudes, (6) domestic eco-
nomic constraints, (7) perceptions of the Soviet 
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threat, (8) arms control agreements, (9) elec-
tions, and (10) inter-service rivalries. For 
completeness we might add factors such as 
domestic economic stabilization policies and 
NATO burden sharing. 
Obviously each of the factors makes a priori 
sense. However, whether or not a given factor 
makes a significant contribution to our under-
standing of the movements in US military 
expenditures is clearly an empirical issue. A 
major problem lies in the fact that, because of 
deficiencies in the data, several of the factors 
are probably not capable of being empirically 
tested (elite perceptions, public opinions, con-
gressional attitudes, and perhaps arms control 
agreements). Using those variables that can be 
expressed in quantitative terms, we have 
attempted to determine the relative strength of 
each factor in affecting US defense expendi-
tures over the 1965-1985 period.2 The purpose 
of this Professional Note is to present the main 
findings of that analysis. 3 
As a general proposition we hypothesized 
that United States military expenditures adjust 
over time to bridge the gap between .what US 
officials consider to be the optimal level of 
defense capability and that which exists at any 
time. The optimal level of preparedness is 
assumed to be a function of events such as 
Vietnam and the Soviet threat. The speed at 
which the gap between actual and optimal 
levels is bridged is not only a function of inertia 
of the federal purchase processes,4 but also 
conditioned by domestic economic constraints. 
Factors such as European NATO defense 
expenditures, detente, inter-service rivalries 
and perhaps the election cycle and/or whether 
a Republican or Democratic administration is 
in power were then added structural factors 
that vary from time to time. , 
Multiple-regression analysis was performed 
using three alternative measures of defense 
effort: (a) actual expenditures, (b) authorized 
expenditures, and (c) budgetary requests. Our 
main empirical results5 indicate that: 
(1) By themselves, Vietnam and the per-
ceived Russian threat account for about 72°!o 
of the variation in actual US defense expendi-
tures. The explained variation falls off to 64% 
for authorized expenditures and 48% for re-
quested defense expenditures. 
(2) Taking into account domestic economic 
constraints contributes another 21 % to our 
understanding of actual military expenditures. 
Two explanatory variables representing econo-
mic constraints increase the explained varia-
tions in authorized and requested military 
expenditures by ~4 and 31 % , respectively. 
However, the lagged budget deficit i~o longer 
significant in the case of autho,9Zed expendi-
tures, while both lagged deficits and deviations 
from the trend in federal revenues are insignifi-
cant for requested expenditures. 
(3) European NATO defense expenditures, 
and inter-service rivalry and political factors 
add an additional 5. 7% to our understanding 
of actual military expenditures. In contrast 
European NATO expenditures and the elec-
tion cycle add 11.1 % to our understanding of 
authorized expenditures, while European 
NATO defense expenditures and inter-service 
rivalry explain an additional 18.3% of the 
variance in requested expenditures. 
(4) All of the political variables decrease in 
their relative significance as we progress 
through the budgetary cycle from requests to 
authorizations, and finally to the actual expen-
ditures stage. In contrast is the pattern of an 
increasing number of significant economic con-
straints as we progress from the budgetary 
stage to authorizations and finally to actual 
expenditures. Interestingly enough, the elec-
tion cycle is significant only at the authoriz-
ation stage:-it does not affect requests or the 
final expenditures. 
In general therefore it appears that US 
military expenditures are mainly determined 
by external threat, and security considerations. 
As the budgetary process proceeds, however, 
economic constraints become increasingly 
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numerous. At the final stage, political vari-
ables enter somewhat marginally to determine 
the actual level of military expenditure under-
taken in any year. 
Alternative models, particularly those stres-
sing the "Military Keynesianism"6 (economic 
stabilization) aspect of defense expenditures 
were also tested, i.e. if military expenditures 
are used to offset fluctuations in the domestic 
economy, the deviations from the trend term 
should be negative and statistically significant. 
No evidence was found to support the use of 
military expenditures as a tool for domestic 
stabilization-strategic factors inducing the 
Soviet threat, European NATO defense 
expenditures and economic considerations 
account for most of the observed movement in 
US defence expenditure. 
As a basis of comparison regression equa-
tions similar to those above were estimated for 
nonmilitary US military expenditures. Again, a 
distinction was made between actual, auth-
orized and requested expenditures. 
In general, the results indicate a number of 
sharp contrasts with those obtained for military 
expenditures: · 
(1) Nonmilitary expenditures do not experi-
ence a distributed lag pattern, so that a gradual 
adjustment of expenditures bridging the gap 
between actual and desired levels of expendi-
tures does not seem to play a role in the US 
budgetary process. 
(2) Nonmilitary expenditures are used for 
stabilizing the domestic economy. 
(3) As with military expenditures, budgetary 
constraints become generally more significant 
at the final or actual stages of the budgetary 
process. However, the budget deficit is posi-
tively correlated with nonmilitary expendi-
tures. Unexpected inflation does not app~ar to 
dampen nonmilitary expenditures as it did 
allocations to the military. 
(4) The election cycle appears quite signifi-
cant in affecting nondefense allocations at the 
actual stage of expenditure, but not at the 
request or authorized stages of the budgetary 
process. 
(5) Military expenditures are apparently in 
conflict with nonmilitary expenditures at the 
request stage of the cycle, but by the time 
actual allocations are made they do not detract 
from nonmilitary allocations. 
It appears that US military expenditures 
while constrained by economic conditions are 
largely determined by strategic and threat 
considerations. Nonmilitary expenditures have 
tended to expand with the overall long-run 
expansion of the esonomy, but in the short run 
are also used to offset fluctuations around this 
long-run trend. In addition political factors 
enter in around election time to reinforce these 
patterns. 
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